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HALL V. FLORIDA: THE SUPREME COURT’S
GUIDANCE IN IMPLEMENTING ATKINS
James W. Ellis*
In Atkins v. Virginia,1 the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that criminal defendants
with mental retardation could not be sentenced to death or be executed because such
an execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment and therefore was pro-
hibited by the Eighth Amendment. A dozen years later, in Hall v. Florida,2 the Court
has reiterated the constitutional holding of Atkins and has given the states guidance
on its implementation.3 The Court held that Florida could not impose an arbitrary
IQ score limitation on the right of capital defendants to seek relief under Atkins.4
While the holding in Hall was relatively narrow, the Court’s decision has reinforced
the importance of protecting individuals with this disability from the death penalty,
and provided helpful context for lower courts facing the task of implementing Atkins
in individual cases.
Cases involving Atkins claims are at the confluence of doctrinal developments
under the Eighth Amendment and professional and clinical understanding about men-
tal disability and its diagnosis. This Article seeks to explore what the Hall decision
teaches about the current understanding in each of these subjects and steps that can
be taken to assure that the rights of defendants who have intellectual disability5 are
fully protected.
* Distinguished University Professor and Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
Professor Ellis represented the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (AAIDD) and other disability organizations as amici curiae in Hall. He previously
served as President of the American Association on Mental Retardation (now known as
AAIDD) and argued the case for Petitioner in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
1 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
3 Id. at 1999 (“This Court . . . reads Atkins to provide substantial guidance on the defi-
nition of intellectual disability.”).
4 Id. at 2001.
5 The Court’s decision in Atkins used the then-accepted clinical term “mental retardation”
to describe the group of individuals within the scope of the case’s protection. See Atkins, 536
U.S. at 320–21. In Hall, both the majority opinion and the dissent chose to adopt the term
now used by most professionals in the field, “intellectual disability.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990
(“This opinion uses the term ‘intellectual disability’ to describe the identical phenomenon.”); see
also id. at 2002 (Alito, J., dissenting). In the decade between Atkins and Hall, clinicians moved
to the latter terminology with near unanimity. See AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF
SUPPORTS 1 (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD, DEFINITION MANUAL]; AM. ASS’N ON INTELL.
& DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, USER’S GUIDE: TO ACCOMPANY THE 11TH EDITION OF 
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I. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN HALL V. FLORIDA
In Atkins, the Court, having ruled that the execution of individuals with mental
retardation was unconstitutional, left to the states “the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.”6
Hall is the first case in which the Court considered a limitation imposed by a state
on the ability of capital defendants with intellectual disability to assert a claim to the
Eighth Amendment’s substantive protection.
The clinical definition of intellectual disability involves three prongs,7 with the
first prong being a significant impairment in intellectual functioning, which is gener-
ally measured by IQ tests. Florida’s statute, enacted in 2001,8 defines this prong as
“‘significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.’”9 While the statute makes
no reference to any specific IQ score, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the statu-
tory language to impose a strict cutoff score of 70,10 and forbade lower courts from
interpreting that score in light of the “standard error of measurement” (SEM), which
is an attribute of any psychometric instrument.11 As a result, the defendant in this case
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 72
(11th ed. 2012) [hereinafter AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE] (“The term intellectual disability covers the
same population of individuals who were diagnosed previously with mental retardation . . . .”);
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS:
DSM-5 33 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter APA, DSM-5]; Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming
of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45
INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 116, 116 (2007). The Court’s shift in terminology
has been welcomed in the disability and clinical communities. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, It’s
‘Intellectual Disability’ Now, NAT’L L.J., June 2, 2014, at 20; Tony Mauro, Supreme Court’s
Use of ‘Intellectual Disability’ Wins Praise, NAT’L L.J. BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (May 28,
2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202657038598/Supreme-Courts
-Use-of-Intellectual-Disability-Wins-Praise. Because the relevant Florida statute and court
decisions, as well as the Atkins decision itself, use the term “mental retardation,” this Article
will use the two terms interchangeably.
6 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (alteration in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 416–17 (1986)).
7 For a fuller discussion of the three prongs of the definition of intellectual disability, see
infra Part II.
8 Florida’s statute was enacted one year before Atkins and was one of the eighteen state
statutes the Court pointed to in identifying a national consensus against executing individuals
with mental retardation. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2001)).
9 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1994 (2014) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2013)).
10 See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712–13 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam), abrogated by
Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986.
11 For a fuller discussion of SEM, see R. MICHAEL FURR & VERNE R. BACHARACH,
PSYCHOMETRICS 118 (2d ed. 2014) (stating that the SEM is “one of the most important con-
cepts in measurement theory”); GARY GROTH-MARNAT, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT 15 (5th ed. 2009) (“The logic behind the SEM is that test scores consist of both
truth and error. Thus, there is always noise or error in the system, and the SEM provides a range
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had his evidence of intellectual disability rejected in the courts below because his IQ
score of 71 was one point over the state’s judicially created ceiling.12 The U.S. Supreme
Court found that the state court’s rejection of other evidence of a defendant’s disability
because of an arbitrary rule regarding IQ scores violated Atkins.13
The Court reached this conclusion for three reasons. The first was that Florida’s
rule was inconsistent with medical and clinical understanding and practice.14 The sec-
ond was that most states had rejected imposing a rule like Florida’s.15 And third, the
Court brought its “own judgment”16 to bear on the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s
protection, concluding that diagnosing intellectual disability was a matter that included
clinical judgment17 and that capital defendants have a right to present all evidence that
would bear on the question of whether they were entitled to constitutional protection.18
II. DIAGNOSING INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND
CLINICAL JUDGMENT
The decision in Hall is firmly grounded in the accepted clinical definition19 of
intellectual disability that has been employed by professionals in the field for
to indicate how extensive that error is likely to be. The range depends on the test’s reliability
so that the higher the reliability, the narrower the range of error.”); Edward J. Slawski, Error
of Measurement, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 395 (Robert J. Sternberg et
al. eds., 1994).
12 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994 (“Pursuant to this mandatory cutoff, sentencing courts cannot
consider even substantial and weighty evidence of intellectual disability as measured and made
manifest by the defendant’s failure or inability to adapt to his social and cultural environment,
including medical histories, behavioral records, school tests and reports, and testimony regarding
past behavior and family circumstances.”).
13 Id. at 2001.
14 Id. at 1995.
15 Id. at 1996–98.
16 “‘[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought
to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.’”
Id. at 1999 (alteration in original) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
17 Id. at 2000 (“‘It must be stressed that the diagnosis of [intellectual disability] is intended
to reflect a clinical judgment rather than an actuarial determination[.]’” (alteration in original)
(quoting AAIDD, DEFINITION MANUAL, supra note 5, at 40)).
18 Id. at 2001 (“Freddie Lee Hall may or may not be intellectually disabled, but the law
requires that he have the opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual disability, including
deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime.”).
19 AAIDD, DEFINITION MANUAL, supra note 5, at 1 (“Intellectual disability is characterized
by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed
in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18.”).
The American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic manual defines intellectual disability in
similar terms. APA, DSM-5, supra note 5, at 33 (“Intellectual disability (intellectual develop-
mental disorder) is a disorder with onset during the developmental period that includes both
intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains.”).
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decades.20 While the holding was relatively narrow—specifically rejecting Florida’s
artificial limitation on the IQ scores that are an essential component of just one prong
of that professional definition—the Court’s opinion also provides some clarity on the
role of various categories of evidence in Atkins cases.21
A. Intellectual Impairment
The first prong of the definition, and the one addressed by the Court in Hall,
involves the individual’s measured intelligence.22 AAIDD’s definition describes this
requirement as “significant” limitation in “intellectual functioning.”23 “Significant” has
always been understood as a term of art and is used to describe measured intelli-
gence that is approximately two standard deviations below the mean.24 As a practical
matter, this means that to satisfy the first prong of the definition an individual will have
measured intelligence in roughly the bottom 2 or 2.5% of the general population.25
The precise issue in Hall was whether Florida (and, at most, a handful of other
states) could impose an arbitrary IQ score ceiling that, by definition, excludes a number
of individuals whose intellectual impairment satisfies the clinical definition of intel-
lectual disability.26 But beyond the relatively technical psychometric question, the Hall
opinion places IQ scores in their proper context in the process of determining which
defendants will be exempt from execution and which will not.27
Although the Court supported its conclusion with references to the clinical
literature about IQ testing,28 the grounding of its constitutional holding is substan-
tially broader. As the majority observed, “Intellectual disability is a condition, not a
20 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993 (“Society relies upon medical and professional expertise to define
and explain how to diagnose the mental condition at issue. And the definition of intellectual
disability by skilled professionals has implications far beyond the confines of the death penalty:
for it is relevant to education, access to social programs, and medical treatment plans.”).
21 Id. at 1990–91, 1994 (listing “medical histories, behavioral records, school tests and
reports, and testimony regarding past behavior and family circumstances” as “probative of
intellectual disability”).
22 See id. at 1994.
23 AAIDD, DEFINITION MANUAL, supra note 5, at 1.
24 Id. at 31 (“The ‘significant limitations in intellectual functioning’ criterion for a diagnosis
of intellectual disability is an IQ score that is approximately two standard deviations below
the mean, considering the standard error of measurement for the specific instruments used
and the instruments’ strengths and limitations.”).
25 See Marc J. Tassé et al., The Construct of Adaptive Behavior: Its Conceptualization,
Measurement, and Use in the Field of Intellectual Disability, 117 AM. J. ON INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 291, 298 (2012).
26 See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994.
27 See id. at 2001.
28 Id. at 2000 (“By failing to take into account the SEM and setting a strict cutoff at 70,
Florida goes against the unanimous professional consensus. Neither Florida nor its amici point
to a single medical professional who supports this cutoff.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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number.”29 The legislatures of the states that had banned the death penalty for individ-
uals with intellectual disability prior to Atkins did not do so because they were focused
on a particular IQ score. Nor was the Court in Atkins motivated by academic fascination
with the psychometrics.
Hall makes clear that the fundamental reason for the constitutional ban on exe-
cuting individuals with intellectual disability springs from the nature of the disability
itself.30 Atkins had identified two parallel sets of reasons, beyond the consensus evi-
denced by legislative enactments, that persons with mental retardation should not
be executed. The first was that a defendant’s intellectual disability means that his or
her execution would serve none of the purposes for which the death penalty has been
adopted, such as deterrence31 or retribution.32 The second group of reasons involved
the Court’s concern that a defendant’s disability could increase the likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice: “These persons face ‘a special risk of wrongful execution’ be-
cause they are more likely to give false confessions, are often poor witnesses, and are
less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel.”33
The fact that the reasons at the foundation of Atkins’s constitutional protection
of defendants with intellectual disability relate to functional limitations rather than
merely to IQ scores raises the question of the appropriate role of those scores in
adjudicating capital cases under Atkins and Hall. The answer is that measurably
impaired intellectual functioning remains an essential component in the process of
determining whether a defendant has intellectual disability,34 but it cannot be the end
of the inquiry.
A defendant claiming protection under Atkins must demonstrate a substantial
impairment in cognitive ability, and that demonstration typically involves evaluating
the results of an IQ test or tests.35 The standard threshold for diagnosing intellectual
disability is that the measured impairment must be at least two standard deviations
below the mean.36 But neither courts nor legislatures are free to impose rigid rules,37
nor can they use IQ scores as an excuse to exclude relevant evidence of an individual’s
29 Id. at 2001.
30 Id. at 1993–94.
31 Such defendants have a “diminished ability” to “process information, to learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses . . . [which] make[s] it less
likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as
a result, control their conduct based upon that information.” Id. at 1993 (alteration in original)
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32 “The diminished capacity of the intellectually disabled lessens moral culpability and
hence the retributive value of the punishment.” Id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
33 Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21).
34 See id. at 1994, 2001.
35 See id. at 1994.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1990 (“[Florida’s] rigid rule . . . creates an unacceptable risk that persons with
intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional.”).
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actual impairment.38 As the Court noted, “[A]n individual’s intellectual functioning
cannot be reduced to a single numerical score.”39
B. Adaptive Limitations
Although the Florida rule overturned by the Supreme Court involved IQ test
scores, the Hall opinion emphasizes the central importance of the second prong of
the definition, deficits in adaptive functioning.40 When testimony on intellectual dis-
ability has produced evidence of cognitive limitations within the diagnostic range
of intellectual disability, “the defendant must be able to present additional evidence
of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits.”41 This
requirement is fully consistent with the Court’s focus on an individual’s functional
impairment. It is the things a person cannot do, or cannot do adequately, that reduce
individual culpability and make execution unacceptable.42
In assessing adaptive functioning, clinicians focus on a variety of deficits.43
AAIDD’s classification manual emphasizes the actual impact of intellectual limita-
tions on the individual’s life44: “Adaptive behavior is the collection of conceptual,
social, and practical skills that have been learned and are performed by people in
their everyday lives.”45 Among the tools available to clinicians in diagnosing adaptive
deficits are standardized psychometric instruments known as adaptive behavior scales.46
Unlike IQ tests, these instruments are not administered to the person who is being
evaluated, but rather focus on other sources of information, including information
provided by teachers, family members, and others familiar with the individual’s
everyday functioning.47 Along with school and social service records and similar
evidence, these may permit an evaluator to determine whether the reduced cognitive
38 Id. at 1995 (“[Florida’s rule] takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a
defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence.”).
39 Id.
40 See id. at 1994 (“The first and second criteria—deficits in intellectual functioning and
deficits in adaptive functioning—are central here.”).
41 Id. at 2001.
42 Id. at 1994; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
43 See, e.g., APA, DSM-5, supra note 5, at 33.
44 AAIDD, DEFINITION MANUAL, supra note 5, at 11.
45 Id. at 43. The APA’s approach is similar. See APA, DSM-5, supra note 5, at 33
(“Deficits in adaptive functioning that result in failure to meet developmental and sociocultural
standards for personal independence and social responsibility. Without ongoing support, the
adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of daily life, such as communication,
social participation, and independent living, across multiple environments, such as home,
school, work, and community.”).
46 See ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS MEASUREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FIELD OF
MENTAL RETARDATION (Robert L. Schalock ed., 1999).
47 See generally Tassé et al., supra note 25; see also id. at 297.
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functioning measured by IQ tests constitutes a real-world disability in the individual’s
life. Since adaptive behavior inquiries in the context of a capital trial are, of neces-
sity, retrospective in nature,48 a thorough individual, educational, and family history
becomes essential.49
A feature of adaptive behavior assessment that causes some confusion is that the
focus is exclusively on deficits and not on strengths.50 At first blush, the exclusive
focus on deficiencies may seem counterintuitive; but clinicians have long recognized
that for almost all individuals with intellectual disability, functional weaknesses coexist
with strengths,51 and there is no “list” of things that no individual with intellectual
disability can do.52 With the increased focus on adaptive deficits after Hall, there is
a substantial risk that triers of fact may fall into the trap of relying on unfounded and
inaccurate stereotypes about what people with intellectual disability can and cannot
do.53 Courts will need to be particularly careful not to rely, either directly or indirectly,
on such stereotypes.
48 For a discussion of the particular challenges of retrospective diagnosis, see AAIDD,
DEFINITION MANUAL, supra note 5, at 95–96; ROBERT L. SCHALOCK & RUTH LUCKASSON,
CLINICAL JUDGMENT 33–39 (2d ed. 2014).
49 An example of the kind of evidence that can be evaluated under the second prong of
the definition can be found in the Hall case itself. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986,
1990–91 (2014).
50 See, e.g., AAIDD, DEFINITION MANUAL, supra note 5, at 1 (“Intellectual disability is
characterized by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive
behavior . . . .” (emphasis added)); APA, DSM-5, supra note 5, at 33 (“Deficits in adaptive
functioning that result in failure to meet developmental and socio-cultural standards for
personal independence and social responsibility.” (emphasis added)).
51 AAIDD, DEFINITION MANUAL, supra note 5, at 45 (explaining that “adaptive skill limi-
tations often coexist with strengths”); AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE, supra note 5, at 1 (“Within
an individual, limitations often coexist with strengths.”).
52 See AAIDD, DEFINITION MANUAL, supra note 5, at 47 (“[I]n the process of diagnosing
[intellectual disability], significant limitations in conceptual, social, or practical adaptive skills
is not outweighed by the potential strengths in some adaptive skills.”); Caroline Everington
& J. Gregory Olley, Implications of Atkins v. Virginia: Issues in Defining and Diagnosing
Mental Retardation, 8 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 1, 8 (2008) (“The argument is often
made that if a person has certain practical skill strengths, the person cannot have mental
retardation, when, in fact, all of the major professional definitions of mental retardation allow
for intraindividual difference in adaptive behavior.”).
53 AAIDD, USER’S GUIDE, supra note 5, at 26 (“These incorrect stereotypes are un-
supported by both professionals in the field and published literature.”); Marc J. Tassé,
Adaptive Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 16
APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 114, 121 (2009) (“[L]aypersons may erroneously interpret
these pockets of strengths and skills as inconsistent with mental retardation because of their
misconceptions regarding what someone with mental retardation can or cannot do.”);
SCHALOCK & LUCKASSON, supra note 48, at 38 (“Regardless of their origin, a number of
incorrect stereotypes can interfere with how a clinician interprets information in making a
retrospective diagnosis.”).
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C. Age of Onset
The third prong of the definition of intellectual disability is the requirement that
the condition have manifested during the developmental period.54 As a practical
matter, this will exclude from the diagnosis only those individuals whose impair-
ment (which satisfies the other two prongs) occurs only in adulthood, as in cases of
traumatic brain injury.
The individual facts in the record provide abundant evidence of early indications
of Mr. Hall’s disability,55 but not every case will produce that much evidence from
childhood. Diagnostic standards do not require actual IQ testing administered during
the developmental period.56 Recollections and contemporaneous indications from
teachers, family members, and others of any delays in an individual’s development
may prove to be important in such a retrospective diagnosis.57
III. THE FUTURE OF ATKINS CASES AFTER HALL
Although the holding in Hall directly affects a relatively small number of capital
defendants in a handful of states,58 the Court’s approach suggests some approaches
and directions in other cases as well.
One clear message is that the states are not free to define intellectual disability in
any way they choose, but must act consistently with the consensus of professionals
in the field.59 As the Court noted, “Atkins did not give the States unfettered discretion
to define the full scope of the constitutional protection.”60 This reminder of the serious-
ness of the constitutional issue should prove instructive if there are circumstances in
which it is proposed that a state should narrow, in some way, the scope of protection
afforded to defendants with intellectual disability. In particular, the Court’s emphasis
54 AAIDD, DEFINITION MANUAL, supra note 5, at 1 (“This disability originates before age
18.”); APA, DSM-5, supra note 5, at 37 (“Onset is during the developmental period . . . .”).
55 See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1991 (2014).
56 AAIDD, DEFINITION MANUAL, supra note 5, at 27 (“Thus, disability does not neces-
sarily have to have been formally identified, but it must have originated during the develop-
mental period.”).
57 Tassé et al., supra note 25, at 296 (“For such a [retrospective] diagnosis, the clinician
must use multiple sources of information, including any data that can be obtained (e.g., school
records, work records) to develop as complete a picture of the person’s history of adaptive
competencies to determine manifestations of possible ID prior to age 18.”).
58 See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001 (“Florida is one of just a few States to have this rigid rule.”).
59 Id. at 1993 (“In determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is proper to consult
the medical community’s opinions.”).
60 Id. at 1998; see also id. at 1999 (“If the States were to have complete autonomy to
define intellectual disability as they wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins could become a
nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not become a
reality. This Court thus reads Atkins to provide substantial guidance on the definition of
intellectual disability.”).
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on scientific and clinical understanding of intellectual disability calls into question the
approach by a few courts that rest heavily on stereotypes about people with intellec-
tual disability rather than on the scientific knowledge and experience accumulated
by professionals in the field.61
Similarly, the central reason for the Court’s rejection of Florida’s inflexible ap-
proach to IQ scores may have broader implications as well. As the Court concluded,
“This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates an unacceptable risk that persons with
intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional.”62 This focus on
the quantification of risk raises serious questions about one state’s unique imposition
of the burden on the defendant to prove his intellectual disability beyond a reason-
able doubt.63
CONCLUSION
The decision in Hall rejects the notion that states have broad latitude to ignore
the scientific understanding of intellectual disability.64 But in a broader sense, the
Court’s decision may prove to be most memorable for its reminder that a primary
function of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
is the “protection of human dignity.”65 The Supreme Court’s emphatic commitment
to vigorous protection of individuals from excessive punishment may prove to be
one of the lasting legacies of this Term.
61 See, e.g., John H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions
of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 689, 710–14
(2009) (criticizing Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); see also Gilbert S.
Macvaugh III & Mark D. Cunningham, Atkins v. Virginia: Implications and Recommendations
for Forensic Practice, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 135–37 (2009).
62 Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990 (emphasis added).
63 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(2)–(3) (2014); Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 622
(Ga. 2003) (finding constitutional Georgia’s statute assigning the defendant the burden of
proving his intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt).
64 See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993, 1999.
65 Id. at 1999.
